Cognitive Interpretation Of The Phenomenon Of Metonymy

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ABSTRACT

Following structural linguistics, considering metonymy as a figure of meaning based on a contiguity relationship, lexical semantics considers metonymy as a mechanism for expanding lexical meaning. Cognitive linguistics regards metonymy as a way of thinking and a cognitive process based on conceptual contiguity. Metonymy in cognitive linguistics is considered a conceptual phenomenon that structures and shapes of human thinking and language. This tool is also considered ubiquitous in the language and has cognitive and communication functions.

Keywords:	metonymy, phenomenon, cognitive, illocution, predicative and reference metonymy.

According to the theory of Redden and Kovech, the ideal cognitive model is considered as a whole, consisting of parts that are conceptual elements. In this sense, metonymy has two forms: metonymy, which is based on the relationship between the whole and its parts, and metonymy, based on the relationship between the parts of a single whole. As a result, the various relationships that form metonymy are generalized around two conceptual structures:

Integral ideal cognitive model and its parts;
Parts of an ideal cognitive model.
Within the framework of the relationships in the first structure "Instead of constituent parts [WHOLE-for-PART] and "part instead of the whole" [PART-for-WHOLE]. If conceptual metonyms are formed, in the second case "Part instead of part" [PART—for—PART], typical metonyms are formed. In the second case, a specific part is perceived within a single cognitive model through the second part. Both types of relationship models are equally active in enriching the system of metonymy.
Z. Kovech, in one of his later works, Kovech points out that the relationship between the whole and the parts can take a slightly different form. It has been observed that the relation of the whole to the part always leads to the appearance of another (Kovecses 2002:150-151).
Redden and Kovech also try to identify principles that provide metonymic conceptualization. They group the principles governing this process as follows:
1) cognitive principles related to the three main indicators of the conceptual structure, i.e. human experience, cognitive choice and cultural alternative;
2) communicative principles that determine the choice of metonymic means and ensure the clarity and relevance of metonymy.
Thus, within the framework of the theory just interpreted, it is recognized that metonymy is not only an event arising from a combination of concepts, but also a product of linguistic forms and object-event relations in reality.
The following theory of the phenomenon of metonymy was formulated by two famous scientists.
K. Renter and L. In his work, Thornburg sought to prove that indirect verbal actions can be

considered as a scenario of a speech act that reflects an ideal cognitive model of regular action.

These actions cover not only the expressed event, but also the knowledge of its conditions, consequences. (Pantera and Thornburg, 1999).

According to the theory proposed by these co-authors, metonymy manifests itself not only at the referential level, but also at the level of utterance and illusion. Based on this pragmatic approach, they separate the metonymy of sentence and illusion into separate types. In particular, the first group includes the metonymy of reference and predication, while the illusion of metaphysics can also be labeled as "speech act metonymy".

Referential metonymy refers to equestrian expressions that serve as an indirect means of expression. For example, White House "White House" can be an indirect representative of the executive branch of the United States, an official of this body, or even the President of the United States.

Predicative metonymy is a metonymic phrase used in the predicative part of a sentence. For example, "She is just a pretty face" in the speech structure "a pretty face" in the noun composition is included in the predicate function. And also "General Motors had to stop production", another type of predicative metonymy is found in speech. Because in this sentence there is also the propositional metonymy "General Motors", at the same time also refers to the company's officials.

In general, the possibility, ability, permission, obligation to perform a certain action are associated with the actual occurrence of an event in the process of metonymic thinking. The conceptual model is activated by a complete memory of one of them or an event. Panter va Thornburg boo model doirasida yuzaga keladigan metanomic iborani POTENTIALITY—for—ACTUALLITY "The opportunity for activation" is called conceptual metonymy (Panter and Thornburg 2003).

Illocutionary metanomy, in turn, occurs when one illocutionary act takes place in a context specific to another. For example, "I don't know where the bath soap is" - asked the Englishman "(Where is the bath soap?)" understands the

content. Apparently, illocutionary metonymy is mainly activated in an indirect speech act, because in the process of meaningful communication one speech act expresses the pragmatic content intended for another.

This metonymic possibility of indirect speech acts is analogous to the fact that one person's characteristic is unique to another. In other words, during the performance of an indirect speech act, the scenario of events alternates. For example, Patner and Thornburgh, please divide the speech act script into the following parts:

BEFORE	H can do A. S wants H to do
CORE	S puts H under a obligation to do A.
RESULT	H is under an obligation to do A.
AFTER	H will do

So this scenario starts with an environment request and a feature availability (Before) section. The following CORE section captures the main characteristics of a request in that the speaker (S) motivates the listener (N). The RESULT section describes how the listener (N) will take responsibility after the request (A) has been made. Finally, the AFTER section specifies that the listener's (N) request must be executed. For example, in the scenario "to give something to someone" it is clear that the main concept is "to give", but a number of signs should not be overlooked, such as the inclination of the listener to this action, the willingness of the speaker to ask for what the listener has. The speaker "Can you give me that book" or "I want that book" achieves the execution of the main part of the script by performing speech acts.

According to scientists who advocate the use of the scenario approach in cognitive linguistics to describe the phenomenon of metonymy, each scenario consists of several parts, and any of these parts can be used to fully describe the scenario. The defense of this approach emphasizes the following (Panther and Thornburg (1998:761:768):

1) the farther from the "Base" (CORE) is part of the script of the speech act, the less likely the metonymic expression;

2) The more scenario fragments are involved in the discourse, the wider the participation of the two-level elements of the event in the process of forming metonymy.

The scenario approach paved the way for the transition of the study of the nature of metonymy from the semantic level to the pragmatic one. The most important feature of this approach is that the cognitive model, which combines the scenario of a speech act and the scheme of events, is the performance of indirect speech acts in various forms and allows us to determine the conceptual basis for their understanding. This can already apply to any part of this model.

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