



Internal and external factors of the establishment of Taliban power in Afghanistan

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses several internal and external factors that led to the establishment of Taliban power in Afghanistan. The answer to how the Taliban, who tried to seize power several times over the years and failed, can be found while reading the article. Most of the listed internal factors can be seen in how much the Taliban managed to seize power and the consequences of the unstable situation caused by external influences.

Keywords:

Internal and external factors, corruption, issue of government legitimacy, "smart diplomacy".

Despite the fact that it has been exactly a year since the establishment of the Taliban power in Afghanistan, the internal and external factors of taking power so quickly are still not falling out of the scope of wide discussion. Indeed, despite having more numbers and better equipment than the Taliban forces, the Afghan forces were unable to maintain control of the government without US military support. By July, the U.S. had withdrawn only a limited contingent of its troops to the United States, leaving the existing official government in Afghanistan unable to fight the Taliban. But during the same process, Joe Biden was asked in the White House, "Is it inevitable that the Taliban will take over Afghanistan?"¹ When asked, Biden dismissed the possibility, pointing to the presence of 300,000 well-armed Afghan forces. But not even a month has passed. On August 15, the capital Kabul was captured. Why couldn't the

Afghan military fight harder to stop the Taliban? Why did the US \$83 billion project to train the Afghan military and provide the army with technology and weapons fail? Why was the officially 300,000-strong Afghan security forces easily defeated by the Taliban, which was several times smaller?

The main and important internal factor that led to the defeat of Ashraf Ghani's administration in a few weeks is corruption. Although official documents indicate that the total security system of the administration consists of 300,000 people, in reality their number is several times less. The fact is that most of the commanders increased the number of their soldiers and appropriated the salaries written for the "dead army". The special inspector of the US Congress on Afghanistan also stated in his latest report that corruption is deeply rooted in the armed forces system, and

¹ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/>

the number of military personnel recorded in official documents is doubtful.² Lust, greed, lack of education - all these negatively affected the morale of the soldiers and caused the loss of fighting spirit.³

In addition, widespread corruption is one of the reasons why the government of Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, who were elected after the Americans came in, is not considered legitimate by a large part of the Afghan public. Ashraf Ghani was elected to a second term at the end of the 2019-2020 election process, which dragged on for several months and was marred by allegations of electoral irregularities. This caused a feeling of mistrust in the people towards the central government. According to analysts, it is the Afghan government's extreme dependence on foreign aid that deprived it of the support of the general public⁴.

When it comes to revenue, the Taliban's resources cannot match the billions of US investments, but the movement has its own sources of revenue. Komron Bohariy, a representative of the research center of the New Lines Institute⁵, said that they made a lot of money, especially from opium, through smuggling, and also collected land tax in the areas under their control, farmers and other businessmen also gave them a share. According to a closed report commissioned by NATO, in 2020 the Taliban earned \$464 million from mining, \$416 million from drug trafficking, \$240 million from foreign donors, another \$240 million from product exports, and taxes. 160 million dollars were collected. All these revenues provided the Taliban with enough weapons, food and other supplies to take over.

Another important point is that this time the Taliban took control of the country not only with military campaigns, but also with "smart" diplomatic efforts. The movement does not have a single leader - it is led by a group of

political leaders, most of whom work from their headquarters in the capital of Qatar. At the meetings in Doha, they assured the American diplomats that they will not hide the leaders of Al-Qaeda from now on, they will abandon the cruel punishment methods and they are in favor of a peaceful solution to the conflict. In addition, the political leadership of the movement held talks with Russia and China and promised not to extend its struggle beyond the borders of Afghanistan. The Taliban delegation was received by the foreign ministries of China and Russia.

Along with the above internal factors, several external factors also helped the Taliban. In particular, Pakistan's support is considered the main external factor in the success of the Taliban. The Taliban movement emerged in the 1990s in the regions of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, as a force opposed to the communist government supported by the USSR⁶. Even now, the seat of the Shura, the military-political council of the Taliban, is located in the Balochistan region of Pakistan. Pakistan's military and intelligence continue to support the Taliban, citing the free movement of militants and weapons across the border, the treatment of wounded militants in Pakistani hospitals, the ability to travel with Pakistani passports and the ability to set up businesses in major cities. In addition, Pakistan's sponsorship of the Taliban is unofficially supported by Saudi Arabia, and Saudi sheikhs and businessmen finance the Taliban. It should be remembered that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the three countries that recognized the emirate of the Taliban in the 1990s. Another rich country in the Persian Gulf, Qatar, gave asylum to the political leadership of the Taliban from Doha. But this time, no country is in a hurry to recognize the Taliban. It has been agreed by the international community that

² <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58187410>

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<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/15/afghanistan-military-collapse-taliban/>

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<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/28/world/asia/afghanistan-security-forces.html>

⁵ Annual report 2020-2021 // New Lines institute for strategy and policy, 2021. – 13 p.

⁶ Rashidov R.R. Afg'onistonda davlatchilik masalasi: tarix va hozirgi zamon. – T.: "Navro'z" nashriyoti, 2017. – 264 b.

recognition can be considered when the Taliban fulfills the following basic requirements⁷:

- Fulfilling one's obligations under the Doha Agreement;
- Government structure representing all political aspects of Afghan society;
- Ensuring human rights and basic freedoms of women;
- To prevent terrorists from using the territory of Afghanistan to threaten.

Foydalanilgan adabiyotlar ro'yxati

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⁷ <https://www.gazeta.uz/oz/2021/10/20/ismatulla-igrashev/#>