



Turkey and the EU: bilateral social and trade relations

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ABSTRACT

This scientific article examines the problems of migration between Turkey and the EU, the strategy of trade relations, the analysis of mutual investments on the example of the countries of Germany and Italy. In particular, the scientific work of scientists and political scientists on this topic was analyzed

Keywords:

Turkey has strong economic ties with many countries. In particular, the European Economic Society has been closely cooperating with the countries of the region since its establishment. Economic relations between the European Union and Turkey have reached a new level today. The European Union, as the largest integrated economic organization on Earth, ranks first in international investment. The 28 member countries of the Union are the leaders of world imports and exports. Turkey's participation in this is also important. In particular, Turkey's economy has a high degree of integration with the European Union. In addition to the removal of customs duties and various other restrictions on industrial and agricultural products, the European Union and the Turkish Customs Union play a crucial role in facilitating the integration process.[1] The Customs Union encourages the vertical integration of Turkish firms into European production networks. Turkey contributes to the modernization of customs administration. The country's membership in the EU has made it

possible to consistently continue economic reforms in the region.

Turkey exported the most goods to Germany and the USA in 2021. The volume of trade with these two countries accounts for 15% of Turkey's total exports. Anadolu agency reports that the Norwegian welfare fund has invested \$812 million in its shares in Turkey until the end of 2020. The economic potential of this state is growing. In recent years, the country's economic partners have been paying great attention to the development of bilateral cooperation. Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and American leader Joe Biden at the meeting set a goal to increase the volume of trade between the two countries sk 21 billion doc 100 billion. Another information: more than 7,600 companies with German investments work in Turkey. In addition, the Turkish leader said during a visit to Istanbul by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Germany intends to increase the volume of foreign trade to \$ 50 billion.[2]

By the autumn of 2020, relations between Turkey and the EU had become extremely tense. Brussels accuses Ankara of violating its rights, as well as member states (Greece, Cyprus). Interference in the outbreak of hostilities around Nagorno-Karabakh, and in fact, it raises the question of the prospects for continuing long-term cooperation with Turkey.

"So far, Ankara has not chosen a positive path in relations with the EU. We condemn the last one-sidedness. Turkey's actions, provocations and aggressive rhetoric in the Eastern Mediterranean are absolutely unacceptable," European Council President Charles Michel said on October 29 following an online EU summit. Our relations cross a watershed for the first time in history: depending on what happens, we will move in one direction or another.in the near future," said the head of European diplomacy Josep Borrel. [3]

This seems natural, given such a crisis in relations with the EU. During 2020, the Turkish leadership not only gave priority to the military sphere, ways to solve its foreign policy tasks in relation to its neighbors, but also expanded the geography of the use of force. In Syria, Ankara has returned from the confrontation with the Kurds. In their border zone ("security zone"), the structures of B. Clashes with Assad's government forces tried to establish direct military control.

The Idlib region, where, as a result of agreements with Moscow, military operations were suspended in February-March. In the same months, the battlefield began in Libya.The Turkish contingent supports the Government of National Reconciliation (GNA). This led to a change in the balance of power in Tripoli in favor of Turkey's ally.Spring-summer, accompanied by warships, intensified work on penetration into hydrocarbon deposits at the bottom of disputed waters on the territory of Ankara, Cyprus and Greece, which sharply increased the level.[4]

Tensions between Turkey and these EU members. Greece reacted. To mobilize Naval Forces and prevent possible clashes between NATO members (Greece and Turkey), French

President E. Macron sent warships and aircraft to the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, in September, Turkey demonstrated its military presence in the South Caucasus during the renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.These are foreign policy manifestations of the implementation of the concept of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan in the name of the "new Turkey". This includes not only a change in political culture, but also a turn from the secularism of the times of Kemal Ataturk to the gradual Islamization of society and the country. World Centers – USA, EU, Russia, China- A.Sh .). "neither the East nor the West, nor Transatlanticism, nor Eurasianism – today's leaders of Turkey do not expect the creation of an independent state on the outskirts of Europe," he writes. Under "loneliness" or even under Erdogan's adviser I. Kalin's expression "precious loneliness" means that Turkey is at an equal distance from the listed world powers. In public speeches, people often hear contradictory theses around the Turkish president.

R.T. Relations between Erdogan and his parties deteriorated significantly economically and politically for the first time in 2013. The fact that the country's GDP is steadily declining from \$951 billion in 2013 to \$754 billion in 2019 is a clear indicator in this regard, namely. almost 200 billion in six years.[5] It is noteworthy that the acceleration of inflation in 2018-2020 is attributed by most analysts not to external factors, but directly to the mistakes of the government. Experts believe that by the fall of 2020, the Turkish lira has become one of the fastest depreciating currencies among countries. As a result, polls have noted a decline in the popularity of the ruling party since 2002.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP): if 43% of voters supported its candidates in the 2018 parliamentary elections, then in July 2020 - about 30-31%.After the suppression of protests in Istanbul in 2013, the authorities intensified repressive practices, which became one of the manifestations of the beginning of the transition to authoritarian rule.

This was the result of the failure of the coup attempt in the country on July 15-16, 2016, the process accelerated: several hundred thousand people were repressed on suspicion of involvement in the bombing (at least 60 thousand people were imprisoned, as of 2016). 150 thousand people were dismissed). Border from the point of view of Turkey's internal political transformation, the referendum on changing the Constitution in April 2017 became the basic law. The powers of the president and their reduction from the Prime Minister, government and Parliament, internal political changes ended in June 2018. Since then, almost all executive power has been concentrated in the hands of President Erdogan. "In general," noted Mark Perini, a well-known expert on Turkey, "from the point of view of Western countries, today's Turkey is an absolute autocracy, where there are no constitutional foundations and law enforcement practice. Complies with its obligations in the Council of Europe and NATO, " they expressed this attitude. As the members of the Council of the European Union quoted in their speech of June 26, 2018, they expressed "concern about Turkey's continuing and deeply disturbing departure from the principles of the rule of law and the fundamental rights of citizens, including respect for the right of citizens to freedom. It is worth noting that Erdogan was and remains one of the elements of the AKP ideology.[6]

This is political Islam in the style of the Muslim Brotherhood. This concept contradicts Wahhabism and Salafism, propagandized in a number of basic postulates, in particular, in Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf (except Qatar) - a factor that contributed to the construction of the country in political terms, increased tension between the monarchies and Turkey. After the failed coup of 2016, the enthusiasm of those around Erdogan increased. He introduces Islamization in many areas of Turkish society, especially in the field of education. This concept does not contradict the fundamentals of the ideology of Turkish nationalism in the style of "neotomanism" and, thus, becomes a

convenient weapon of power not only in domestic but also in foreign policy. The very idea of "Ottomanism" is interpreted today by the political elite of Turkey.

The desire to restore its influence on the borders of the Ottoman Empire (of course, not to mention the physical expansion of borders and the establishment of direct control over other countries, but the establishment of Turkey as the leader of the Muslim space led to creeping Islamization in the style of Erdogan due to the recognition of this status by other states of the region, which initially supported the state as a Party of the nationalist movement (MHP), led by Bakhcheli, a radical representative of nationalism, did not cause the rejection of his supporters. This organization is considered extremely nationalistic and eurosceptic, i.e. joining the EU is against the long-standing official course of Turkey. It was with him that Erdogan's coalition with the AKP was formed. Many analysts see this as a serious tectonic change in the political landscape of this country.[7]

The second significant blow to Turkish politics was the results of the 2019 elections: the mayors of the two capitals - Istanbul and Ankara - became. The loss of these two cities seriously undermined the reputation of the authoritarian ruler. In response, Erdogan took a number of measures to limit the influence of the two leaders mentioned. M. Pierini believes that these two events were a manifestation of a new reality - "they put an end to the monopoly of the AKP in Turkish politics." Thus, in the last two years, the following fundamental internal factors have influenced the political decision-making process in Turkey: the collapse of the economy, the concentration of power in the hands of President Erdogan, the formation of a religious-nationalist Union, and the revival. (After a wave of repression and amid the growing conflict around Turkey) the role of generals loyal to the president. The combination of these factors influences the formation. The analysis of the International Institute for Strategic Studies defines its specifics as follows: "the concentration of executive power in the hands of President

Erdogan is accompanied by the personification and deinstitutionalization of foreign policy, the formation and implementation of which currently depends entirely on foreign policy. Erdogan makes decisions personally, on the advice of a small number of his loyal supporters. Meanwhile, many Western analysts tend to explain Erdogan's stricter approach to such fundamental issues as relations. In foreign policy, Erdogan promoted the formation of "hard power" methods, and the change in the situation in the territories adjacent to the Turkish borders was the first and most important change in this regard for all Ankara governments - the Kurdish problem. From the predominantly internal threat that has existed for many decades, since 2015, Erdogan's entourage has also viewed it as an external threat that will change the geopolitical situation in southern Turkey.[8] The fact is that in the face of increasing signs of defeat in the civil war in 2015, Syrian President B. Assad withdrew his troops from three enclaves inhabited by Kurds. Moving them to the north of the country to the places of decisive battles with the opposition. Soon, these enclaves were filled with militants associated with the PKK. (PKK) is recognized as a terrorist organization in Turkey, as well as in the EU countries.

Erdogan was also outraged by the fact that Kurdish groups gradually began to be considered in Washington and Brussels as key partners in the fight of the global coalition. With the main ground combat formation against ISIS and terrorists banned in Russia. Thus, they received weapons from the United States and the European Union, and also received combat training in coalition camps. Erdogan's attempts to oust Kurdish armed groups from Turkey's borders have led to a series of terrorist attacks in Turkey. The result is Ankara for 2018-2019. He conducted a number of military operations in northern Syria in order to create a "security zone" on the border. These operations have attracted sharp criticism.

First, the European Union. The Trump administration has remained silent on this issue since the US president announced his

intention to withdraw US troops from Kurdish-controlled territories in northern Syria in December 2018. He even intended to shift all responsibility for the development of events in these regions to Erdogan, which also caused criticism from Brussels and Western Europe. Politicians feared that Erdogan would have a free hand to defeat the Kurds. Finally, the third important factor that influenced Ankara's forceful pull to the north was Syria - the deployment of Russian aerospace forces in Latakia in September 2015. In November of the same year, there was a collision between Turkey and the Russian Federation (a Russian bomber was shot down, the pilot was killed). In 2016, the normalization of relations between Moscow and Ankara continued in the context of an increase in Turkey's military presence south of the Turkish-Syrian border.

Another big change in Turkey's geopolitical adaptation is associated with the weakening of its dependence on Russian gas and, in fact, becoming a regional energy center providing hydrocarbon supplies to Europe. Its territory is the Southern Gas Corridor. In July 2019, the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TAP) was completed, connecting the Shah Deniz mine field in Azerbaijan with Turkey, and then with European consumers. In the Turkish energy market, Russia is completely displaced by Azerbaijan (23.5%) and Iran (14.2%): if in March 2019 our country was the leader in gas supplies to Turkey (33%), then in March this year, according to Epdk, the Turkish energy regulator, which reduced the market, the share was 9.9%. This includes Erdogan's statement that reserves of "the highest quality gas" have been discovered. Thus, the energy factor, on the one hand, strengthens Ankara's weight and position in relation to the European Union, and on the other hand, largely explains the rigidity of Erdogan's statements and actions. In contrast to Ankara's imperative approach to the security-related conflict in Syria, its positions towards Azerbaijan and Libya are significantly dominated by economic interests and calculations. In the interests of the allies - Baku and Tripoli - Erdogan acts harshly and

according to the same scheme: bellicose statements are supported by assistance in the supply of weapons and military equipment (especially drones), Turkish military instructors, as well as the deployment of units from the middle of the Syrian opposition by the militants of Bashar al-Assad. Ankara began providing military assistance to the GNA in Libya in the first months of 2020 and by spring had achieved impressive results: X. The offensive of Haftar's army on Tripoli was stopped, and then its partial offensive began. There, the civil war itself began to move into a "frozen" phase." [9]

On November 27, 2019, Erdogan said that the head of the PNS F.He signed an agreement with Sarraj on military cooperation on the delimitation of maritime borders in the eastern Mediterranean on November 27, 2019. The latter document caused an international scandal and a sharply negative reaction from the European Union, since the signatory countries declare the Turkish part of the exclusive economic zone of Greece. This casts doubt on the implementation of some oil and gas projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish intelligence operations, launched soon in the disputed territories around the islands belonging to Greece and Cyprus, sharply aggravated the situation - the likelihood of a military conflict between Athens and Ankara (NATO members) has significantly increased. French President E. Macron and the head of EU diplomacy J.Borrel undertook to prevent such a development of events.

Their efforts eliminated the threat of real clashes, but the confrontation continued in political ways. In particular, between Paris and Ankara -in particular, after Erdogan's scandalous statement about the murder of a schoolteacher in France - the Turkish leader called, among other things, for Muslims to boycott the French. In this context, on October 27, Paris spoke at the EU online summit.

With a proposal to respond to the actions of the Turkish leadership, a senior official of the French government, Frank Riester, said that Erdogan's behavior outrages "the whole of Europe", which must protect

itself from Ankara by taking measures to "strengthen the balance of power with Turkey." In the end, Erdogan, Rister notes, is strengthening control over a number of neighboring provinces."Macron's criticism of Erdogan's policy was not only Eastern.

Confirms with full confidence the participation of Syrian jihadist groups delivered through Gaziantep to the theater of military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh. This is an incredibly important situation that changes the situation," Macron was quoted as saying by TASS. European news agencies after the tragedy connected with the murder of a teacher by an Islamic terrorist in France, verbal clashes between the two presidents began to acquire an increasingly personal and even offensive character.

An analysis of the dramatic events of recent months in Turkish-European relations suggests that reliance on the formation of a "hard power" component in Turkey's foreign policy most likely does not mean that the leadership of this country is ready to distance itself from it. In addition, there is no mention that Erdogan prefers to get closer to Russia to the detriment of his Western partners. Ankara still retained a significant part.[10]

There is a positive potential in relations with Brussels, for example, in the "migration agreement", or Ankara, involved in regional conflicts, in particular, tries not to cross the "red lines" so as not to aggravate tensions in relations with the EU. Thus, Erdogan's supporters, who are "unconditionally" criticized from Brussels for the use of force in the Kurdish areas of Syria, claim that B. Insisting on the departure of Assad, who is still on the same side in the conflict with the EU, we see the same thing in Libya: Brussels criticizes Ankara for military intervention, but this, nevertheless, is done on the side of the NTC, created by the EU and the UN.

As for the legal status of some coastal economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean, Brussels says that from a political and emotional point of view, the confrontation between Presidents Erdogan and Macron, Paris and Ankara is more like a confrontation

between the two heads of these countries. It is obvious that the statements and assessments of EU officials regarding the current critical stage in relations with Turkey are more balanced than the statements of the leaders of individual EU countries (for example, France, Greece, Cyprus). [9] This indicates that the EU leadership is trying to react in a balanced and moderate manner to conflict situations with Turkey, considering it in practice not as a candidate for EU membership, but as an influential neighbor whose actions can be of great importance for European countries. This is due to the economic and security point of view. The general conclusion is that, despite the intensity of verbal clashes and some muscle tension, the parties - the EU and Turkey - reserve the means to eliminate the accumulated problems and possible normalization.

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