



US and NATO Military Presence in Afghanistan in 2001-2014 to Achieve Military and Political Goals in the Central Asian Region

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ABSTRACT

In this article, the author examines important aspects of US strategic interests in Central Asia, primarily related to the aspirations of the United States and its NATO partners to achieve their political and military goals in Afghanistan and the Central Asian region. Also, the peculiarities of the implementation of the plans of Western countries led by the United States with the deployment of military bases on the territory of the states of the region, from which not only the penetration of foreign troops into Afghanistan was carried out, but also comprehensive support during the operation "Unbending Freedom".

The work details the actions of the leadership of NATO and the United States to organize an armed invasion of Afghan territory. The article analyzes the development of relations between the countries of the Central Asian Republic and the United States, as well as other Western states, both in the political and military-technical spheres. It also describes significant events related to the closure of military bases on the territory of individual states in the region and the change in US approaches to solving military and political tasks in Afghanistan.

Keywords:

Politics, military strategy, coalition, Afghanistan, Central Asia, United States of America, North Atlantic Alliance, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), terrorist organizations, terrorist act, military base, color revolution, regional organizations.

I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transformation of the bipolar world order into a unipolar one in the early 1990s of the twentieth century led to a new geopolitical redistribution of spheres of influence. The changes that have taken place in the geopolitical sphere and led to the emergence of new independent and sovereign states on the political map of the world have made significant changes in the alignment of military and political forces in the CAR.

The region, due to its geographical location in Eurasia, currently remains the center

of the clash of geopolitical interests of the leading world powers. The famous American politician and diplomat Z. Brzezinski in his book "The Grand Chessboard" wrote: "Eurasia is the center of the world, and he who controls Eurasia exercises control over the whole world" [Brzezinski Z.: 3]

After the collapse of the USSR, the United States was in no hurry to accelerate the development of active ties with the countries of the Central Asian region (CAR) because of their belonging to Islamic civilization, without assigning them a paramount place in the scale of Western political priorities and values.

The geopolitical position of the CAR countries, located between two world powers - Russia and China, contributed to their desire to establish peaceful interaction with their neighbors. In this regard, the United States has intensified its efforts to achieve its own geopolitical goals and interests in opposition to Russian and Chinese aspirations.

Gradually, the United States formed certain strategic interests in relation to this region. Especially the attention of the American administration was attracted by Afghanistan, where in the early 90s of the twentieth century the Taliban movement arose. Thanks to the activities of the Pakistani security agencies, supported by the special services of the United States and Great Britain, as well as the financial support of Saudi Arabia, the Taliban have become an organized political force. By 1995, the Taliban controlled about 90% of the country's territory.

In 1996, a political regime based on radical Islamist ideology was established in Afghanistan. The socio-political life of the country was regulated by Sharia law and the regulations of the mullahs. It was during this period, at the invitation of the Northern Alliance, that the Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden appeared in Afghanistan, who, after the mujahideen were defeated, joined the Taliban movement. Over time, he transformed into an implacable enemy of the United States and the main professional militant of the well-hidden Islamic radical organization al-Qaeda. Its only method of fighting was terror.

After the terrible terrorist attacks carried out in 2001 on the territory of the United States by al-Qaeda terrorists, Afghanistan became the main object of military invasion for Western countries led by the United States. From 2001 to 2014, a large foreign military contingent operated in Afghanistan to combat terrorists, establish political stability and military security in the country, unfortunately, which were not implemented.

In addition, being on Afghan soil under the "good intention of fighting terrorists", and then the hasty departure of the military contingents of the United States and its allies did

not contribute to the full stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. This is evidenced by the re-rise to power in Kabul of the Taliban movement, the presence in the country of various stripes of terrorist organizations that sow chaos, poverty and death among Afghans and generate instability, both in Afghanistan and in the region as a whole.

This work analyzes in detail the actions of the leaderships of the United States and the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to implement military-political goals with the conduct of a military action in Afghanistan, as well as issues of developing mutual relations between the United States, NATO and the countries of the Central Asian region in the framework of the fight against terrorist groups on Afghan territory.

The main purpose of this article is to reveal the approaches of the Americans and their allies in the alliance in achieving military-political goals, as well as the features of establishing relations with the states of the CAR in the political and military spheres in the period under review.

II. US and NATO military action against terrorists in Afghanistan and issues of interaction with the countries of the CENTRAL African Republic

Since coming to power in early 2001, the Republican administration, headed by President George W. Bush, has been in office. Bush Jr., immediately began to clarify the priorities of American domestic and foreign policy. On January 31, 2001, the head of state held the first meeting of his cabinet, where the priority goals of military policy in the activities of the administration were outlined and the tasks for their implementation were outlined.

As for the COUNTRIES OF THE CAR, the administration of J. S. Bush Jr., from the beginning of his term of office, believed that the military-political goals of the United States in the region should be aimed mainly at preventing the leadership of other geostrategic players in Central Asia – Russia and China.

Also, during this period, military-political relations between the United States and the countries of the region developed.

Despite the promise to create multilateral institutions of cooperation and conflict resolution in the region, this has not affected the real American policy pursued in the region.

The desire to create a unipolar world with the dominant role of the United States, the positioning of the country as the sole judge in resolving world problems put before the American President George W. Bush. Bush Jr. and his administration's task is to reconsider the place of the CAR in American military policy, as well as approaches to ensuring the geopolitical interests of the United States both in Afghanistan and in Central Asia [Smith D., Cordin M. : 7].

These processes accelerated the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in Washington and New York, in which the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda was involved. After the tragic events, the military policy of the Bush administration underwent a significant transformation. The head of the White House called this attack the first war of the twentieth century [The Washington Post: 2001].

His administration has not only continued to focus on U.S. strategic rivals Russia and China, but has also shifted the focus of its foreign policy efforts to fighting international terrorism.

On 20 September 2001, J. S. Smith was appointed to the Senate of the United States of America. Bush Jr. has declared a U.S.-led "crusade" against international terrorism. The statement said that in order to destroy the global terrorist network, the United States would use all the resources at its disposal: diplomatic, legislative, financial, military [The New York Times: 2001.]

Through the White House-controlled media, an intensified preparation of world public opinion has begun for the fact that terrorists, especially from al-Qaeda, are capable of using suicide bombers as live bombs with nuclear warheads, as well as biological and chemical weapons. The military-political leadership of the United States assumed that the deadly components of these weapons could be purchased on underground markets in the countries of the post-Soviet space or in Iraq,

Iran or North Korea. The Bush administration believed that at that time the deployed network of al-Qaeda branches was located in 60 countries around the world (The New York Times: 2001).

In this regard, for the American leadership, the main military-political goal in the fight against international terrorism was the destruction of its main base located on the territory of Afghanistan.

By the beginning of October 2001, the US Department of Defense had planned and approved a secret military operation by the American president. It was originally called Infinite Justice, then renamed Unbending Freedom.

The analysis of the unclassified part of the document allowed the author to highlight the declared goals of the military operation: to deploy a global fight against international terrorism; defeat the IEA and Al-Qaida militias; destroy the infrastructure of terrorism in the territory of the IEA; capture (kill) al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden and the leaders of the Islamic Taliban movement.

According to foreign politicians, military and diplomats, historians and political scientists, which the author of the scientific article adheres to, the real goals of the American military action in Afghanistan were:

- eliminate the IEA as a public entity that pursues a policy independent of the United States;

- to remove the Islamic Taliban from the political arena of Afghanistan;

- to bring a pro-Western government to power in the country;

- demonstrate to the international community the readiness of the United States to lead the fight against international terrorism;

- to consolidate the position of the United States in a strategically important region of Asia.

At the same time, in a very significant region, the political, economic and military influence of other states, especially Russia and China, should be reduced.

Moreover, the United States, when planning a military operation in Afghanistan,

referred only to The 51st Article of the UN Charter [the UN Charter and the Status of the International Court of Justice, 1997: 39], as well as to previously adopted UN Security Council resolutions on the situation in Afghanistan No. 1269 (1999).¹, No 1333 (2000)² and No. 1363 (2001)³, without the approval of a special resolution of this body on the use of military force there by the international community. After all, in accordance with the UN Charter⁹, the necessary actions to maintain or restore international peace and security were authorized exclusively by the UN Security Council [UN Charter and Status of the International Court of Justice: 39].

At the same time, on October 2, 2001, without waiting for the UN Security Council to sanction the use of armed forces in Afghanistan, the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance decided to enter into force the 5th paragraph of the NATO Charter [NATO Briefing 2003: 4], according to which military aggression against one of the members of the organization is regarded as aggression against the entire alliance.

Speaking in Brussels on this occasion, NATO Secretary General George W. Bush said that nato would be able to respond to the United States of America. Robertson said that the members of the alliance have no doubt that the organizer of the terrorist attacks in the United States is Osama bin Laden and his group [Website URL: NATO: 2021].

The attack on the United States was regarded as "external aggression." In this regard, the joint retaliatory strike by NATO countries against the aggressor, which was recognized as international terrorism, were legitimate actions.

At the preparatory stage for the US invasion of Afghanistan, agreements were concluded on the establishment of military bases, the use of airspace and the logistical support of its own armed forces in the CAR. One of the first states to sign an agreement with the United States was Uzbekistan, which had experience in combating the radical terrorist organization Islamic Movement Uzbekistan.

On October 5, 2001, during negotiations in Tashkent between the United States and Uzbekistan, an agreement was signed on the establishment of a military base on its territory. The analysis of the document revealed the beginning of a new stage in relations between the governments of the two countries, based on strengthening security and regional stability. The need to develop appropriate measures in the event of a direct threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan was emphasized. In exchange for American assistance, the Uzbek side for an offensive operation against the Taliban provided an opportunity for American troops to use one of the bases located on the territory of Uzbekistan. It was emphasized that, first of all, the base should be used for humanitarian purposes. However, its subsequent use for military purposes was implied.

Such an object was the Karshi-Khanabad airbase (a military airfield in Khanabad, located in the Kashkadarya region of Uzbekistan near the city of Karshi). A large transport and logistics hub was formed here, which made it possible to transfer a military contingent, equipment and cargo to Afghanistan. By mid-October 2001, the base housed the personnel of the 10th Light (Mountain) Division of the US Army in the amount of 1,000 troops, as well as F-15, F-16 fighters and C military transport aircraft. -17. In order to use the aircraft unhindered, the US military had to modernize the runway and generally update the infrastructure of the airfield. In addition, the United States pledged to pay Uzbekistan money for the use of the air base. However, they neglected their obligations - payments were irregular.

Having received the air base at its disposal, the United States on October 7, two days after the signing of the agreement on it, with the support of Great Britain in preparation for a ground operation, carried out a joint bombing of Taliban facilities and areas in Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States began to carry out military action as a separate state pursuing its own military-political goals. The military contingent participating in the operation was

subordinated directly to the Pentagon. Formally, the United States did not coordinate its actions with the UN (only informed the international body) [Nikitin A.: 102].

Effective US military assistance in the initial period was provided by Great Britain and Australia (and a little later - Canada and New Zealand), mainly by special forces formations. With their active participation in October-December 2001, "the United States managed to successfully conduct an operation to eliminate the Taliban regime. At the same time, significant assistance to the Western Allies was provided by the so-called "Northern Alliance", whose combat formations, consisting mainly of Afghan Uzbeks, Tajiks and other national minorities traditionally negatively disposed towards the Pashtuns who formed the core of the Taliban movement, in fact, independently "cleansed" the northern regions of the country from Islamic extremists" [Pechurov S.: 8-20].

In December 2001, "the UN Security Council only adopted Resolution 1378⁴, which provides a mandate for a multilateral international operation in Afghanistan – a political mission with components of enforcement actions in accordance with the UN Charter. It became the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), later led by NATO."

The UN Security Council authorized ISAF to assist the Afghan interim government in providing security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. In December 2001, the Provisional Transitional Council was established, chaired by Hamid Karzai, a supporter of the United States, whose goal was to form a new government.

It was planned that the number of international forces would be about 5 thousand troops. A total of 18 States have declared their desire to contribute troops to ISAF, 12 of which (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) were members of NATO. 5 countries (Austria, Finland, Bulgaria, Sweden and Romania) were part of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. Thus, ISAF in Afghanistan was

controlled not only by the UN, but also by NATO.

The increase in the number of participants in Operation Enduring Freedom was the reason for the United States to appeal to the leadership of Kyrgyzstan with a request to provide territory and airspace for military actions in Afghanistan by the forces of the anti-terrorist coalition.

On December 4, 2001, the United States and Kyrgyzstan entered into an agreement to provide a portion of Manas Airport for the basing of military personnel and aircraft that took part in the operation in Afghanistan for a period of one year with automatic prolongation. On December 16, 2001, the first U.S. servicemen arrived in Manas. Initially, 200 US military and transport aircraft were stationed at the base - three C-17 and two C-5A. It was envisaged that the US cost of maintaining the Manas base would be about \$ 50 million a year.

Kyrgyzstan agreed to base representatives of the US armed forces and 11 other countries in Manas: Australia, Spain, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, Poland, South Korea and France. However, the units of some of these states for the entire period of the base's existence have never visited it. In general, during the active military phase of the operation in Afghanistan, about 1.7 thousand troops were stationed here, as well as fighters, military transport aircraft and tanker aircraft of the coalition states.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that Uzbekistan provided a military base not only to the United States, but also to another NATO member – Germany. In February 2002, Tashkent and Berlin signed an agreement on the lease of the civilian airport of Termez to the German Air Force. Analysis of this agreement made it possible to de facto reveal the construction of the first German military base outside the country after the end of world war II - the Termez Strategic Transit Air Base. 7 C-160 transport aircraft and 5 CH-53 helicopters were used to support military operations in Afghanistan, manned by 300 German troops. The agreement on the use of the military base in Termez was concluded in

exchange for military-technical cooperation with Germany, which provided for the supply of weapons and equipment and the provision of financial assistance. The base was actively used by other members of the anti-terrorist coalition - the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, Spain and France.

At the same time, it should be noted that "despite the absence of Western military bases in other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan from the autumn of 2001 to June 2002 allowed the use of the Ayni airfield near Dushanbe for refueling more than 400 C-17 cargo aircraft of the US Air Force. In November 2001, with Tajikistan's permission, the U.S. military inspected the Kulyab, Khujand, and Kurgan-Tyube air bases for their use in the anti-terrorist operation" [Parkhomenko S.: 220]. However, the permanent contingent of the United States in the country was never deployed.

"Despite the permission to use its airspace for the passage of military aircraft of the anti-terrorist coalition forces, Kazakhstan did not agree to the deployment of US-NATO military facilities in the republic" [Parkhomenko S.: 220].

According to the military-political leadership of the country, it was the absence of US and NATO military bases in Kazakhstan that reduced the risk of a terrorist threat to the republic, unlike Uzbekistan, where the presence of an American base did not prevent terrorist actions and the organization of anti-government riots with the use of violence.

In January 2002, the U.S.-Kazakhstan Commission decided to increase the level of cooperation in the military sphere in the context of ISAF operations in Afghanistan. In February 2002, the UN Security Council approved Kazakhstan's proposal to send a peacekeeping battalion to Afghanistan as an auxiliary military unit to perform engineering and technical work, as well as to participate in humanitarian operations. However, due to the low level of professional suitability, he did not provide significant assistance to the moral and psychological state of the personnel and discipline [Khazanova A. : 15].

III. Strategy for the realization of us and its allies military-political goals in Afghanistan and the CENTRAL African Republic

In the period from 2001 to 2002, there were several significant visits of representatives of the American administration to the CAR. After these visits, the administration of US President Bush Jr. revised the main military and political goals of the United States in the international arena, including in relation to Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia.

The military-political significance of the events in Afghanistan and the new strategically important Asian subregion for the United States and NATO was due not only to the possibility of using military bases in the CAR, but also to the return of the deterrence strategy from the Asian center. It made it possible, if necessary, to change the vector of US military planning and keep Iran, the south of Russia, the north-east of China, etc. under control.

On September 20, 2002, the military-political goals of the United States were significantly expanded and promulgated in the "National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002." («The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002»)⁶. The document stated that the war against global terrorism is significantly different from any other war conducted in the history of the United States. These included the presence of several fronts of hostilities, the duration of the struggle and the difficulty in identifying the enemy [Kuzntsov D.: 510]. The presence of American troops abroad in accordance with the allied obligations of the United States, their readiness to use for their own protection and the protection of allies were confirmed.

To solve security problems, the United States announced the need to use bases and facilities both in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, and beyond, since before the war in Afghanistan this area was not a priority in American military planning [Kuzntsov D.: 528].

Following the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in April

2003, the NATO Council, pursuing its political-military objectives, decided to expand its support for ISAF. The NATO Council, retaining the same name and formal tasks for these forces, provided overall direction, coordination and planning of operations. ISAF was managed under the leadership of the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Europe, the American four-star General J. S. Smith. Johnson from NATO Headquarters. On 11 August 2003, ISAF in Afghanistan was formally taken over by NATO.

Implementing in practice in Afghanistan and the CAR the updated military-political goals, the United States and NATO in a matter of months, as it seemed, reshaped the whole of Central Asia. The United States, having destroyed the Taliban movement in Kabul, expanded its presence in the region and established a number of new partnerships in the field of security. Central Asian countries provided comprehensive support to the United States and ISAF in Afghanistan, fighting Islamist militants, allowing foreign contingents to stay on their territory.

However, this optimistic perception of U.S. role and goals under President George W. Bush in the CAR did not last long. The U.S.-NATO intervention in Afghanistan and later in Iraq marked the peak of their influence in Eurasia. Following the overthrow of the Taliban, the U.S. administration faced the prospect of a greater presence in the region. Maintaining security partnerships with governments. Central Asia has correlated poorly with interference in their internal affairs.

The continued military presence of the United States has led to the desire of China and Russia to strengthen the position of their own security organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

The new contradictions in the region did not contribute to the achievement by the United States of its military-political goals in the CAR countries. The events of the "color revolutions" in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and then in Kyrgyzstan (2005), organized and financed by the United States, caused an

aggravation of the military-political situation in the region. In May 2005, fearing the development of a "color revolution" in their own country, the Uzbek authorities brutally restored order in the city of Andijan. The US administration condemned the actions of the military-political leadership of Uzbekistan and demanded an international investigation.

The Uzbek government has reduced the activity of the US military base Karshi-Khanabad on its territory and expelled Western NGOs from the country. At the end of July 2005, the country's authorities stopped the operation of the base due to the fact that the United States could not justify the further stay of the military base in the country. In 2006, after Uzbekistan joined the CSTO, the contradictions in relations with the United States intensified.

A number of political problems were faced by representatives of the American administration in Kyrgyzstan. The status of the base at Manas, which was used as a transit point for almost all American military personnel moving to and from Afghanistan, was called into question.

Trying to reduce the implementation of US military-political goals in Central Asia, Russia and China took advantage of tense relations between the White House and the governments of the CAR countries to strengthen their own institutions in the region. The activities of the CSTO were expanded, a base was created in Manas next to the American one, and an agreement was reached with Tajikistan on the deployment of more than 5,000 troops in the country. In turn, the regional initiatives developed by the SCO included: holding military exercises twice a year, creating its own Center for Combating Terrorism in Tashkent.

With the beginning of the second term of the presidency of J. S. Bush Jr., his administration was forced to adjust the military-political goals of the United States both around the world and, in particular, in Afghanistan and the COUNTRIES OF THE CAR. Most of them were reflected in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,⁷ which stated for the

first time that "America is at war", referring to the fight against terrorism.

However, official American law does not reveal any documents on the transfer of American society to a state of war. With this phrase in the NSC-2006, the US President stressed that the new strategy is aimed at ensuring the country's security in the face of new challenges and threats of the twentieth century [Kuzntsov D.: 531].

In the NSC-2006, it was stated that the sphere of geopolitical interests and goals of the United States includes: the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, South and Central Asia, East Asia, Russia [Kuzntsov D.: 555-559]. At the same time, Afghanistan and Iraq were assessed as the front line of the fight against terrorism. The document noted that the goal of the United States is democratic changes in these countries, since the results of democratization activities were insufficient.

By the end of 2006, the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance had significantly expanded ISAF in Afghanistan from 18 to 37, including 26 NATO countries. The number of ISAF troops has increased to 35,000.

Afghan territory was divided into operational areas, each of which was subordinate to one of the leading countries of the alliance. From it was appointed a regional commander, endowed with full power, which had an occupation character. The north of the country was under German control; west – Italy; south – Great Britain (then Canada and by the summer of 2007 – the Netherlands); east – the United States and the center (Kabul) – France (then Turkey). The entire country was nominally controlled by an international force led by NATO. The most unstable areas of Afghanistan – eastern and southern – were controlled by the joint efforts of the United States, Great Britain and Canada.

To the protracted struggle in these areas with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the United States and NATO decided to involve the Afghan National Army (ANA) of the government created with their help, which was headed by President Hamid Karzai. The plan was to have a

70,000-strong ANA. However, during the implementation of the plan, the official authorities of Afghanistan, as well as allies, faced certain difficulties. The low level of combat capability of the personnel of the new army, aggravated by the growing desertion of soldiers and sergeants in the units that participated in the hostilities against the Taliban, the lack of sufficient ammunition and military equipment to equip the units put into operation contributed to the revision of the earlier scheduled dates for the final formation of the ANA, postponing it to a later time [Vasilyev A.: 15].

IV. Change of military-political course by Western countries at the head of the United States in achieving goals in Afghanistan and the Central African Republic under the administration of B. Obama

In general, by the end of the presidency of J. S. Bush Jr. the United States failed to fully realize its military-political goals in Afghanistan, despite the increase in ISAF participants, and even more so in the countries of Central Asia. The war and international intervention on Afghan soil have changed the attitude of the governments and publics of the Central Asian states to these events, especially after the US imposed its own democratic values on them.

The Democratic administration headed by President B. Obama, which replaced the Republicans in the US government in January 2009, had to take into account a number of circumstances when making further decisions regarding Afghanistan and the CENTRAL African Republic: the plans and goals of the previous administration in the region that had not been fully implemented; the current regional military and political situation in the fight against terrorism, which affected the security of many neighboring States; a protracted Afghan campaign that has become unpopular in American society itself.

In February 2009, following talks in Moscow, the Kyrgyz government closed the U.S. military base in Manas. On February 19, 2009, Kyrgyzstan's unicameral parliament decided to denounce the agreement with the United

States. The decision to terminate it entailed the termination of treaties with the remaining ISAF member states: Australia, Denmark, Italy, France, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Spain and Turkey [The Parliament of Kyrgyzstan voted to withdraw the US Manas air base: 2009].

In the summer of 2009, in the course of lengthy negotiations, the United States, with the mediation of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan, according to which the Manas air base was repurposed into a "Transit Center at Manas International Airport". The annual budget for the operation of this Center in the country provided for \$ 60 million.

Given the prevailing circumstances around Afghanistan and beyond, the Obama administration was forced to admit in the next American "National Security Strategy, May 2010" ("The National Security Strategy May 2010", hereinafter referred to as the NSC-2010)⁸ that the operation in Afghanistan is part of a plan to destroy, eliminate and defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates [Kuzntsov D.: 565].

Guided by the provisions of the NSC-2009, President B. Obama in December 2009 decided to increase the number of US military contingent in Afghanistan. To this end, an additional 30,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Afghan territory in the first half of 2010. In view of the increased size and power of the anti-terrorist coalition, it was planned to eliminate: the Taliban's control of the country's strategic areas and communications; to prevent them from using Pakistani territory as a rear base; to increase, with the help of American advisers, the combat capability of the national security forces of Afghanistan.

Therefore, taking into account the protracted military action in Afghanistan, the Obama administration decided to increase the number of ISAF by attracting contingents of troops from other countries. According to the plan of the United States and NATO, a large-scale increase in the number of troops in Afghanistan was supposed to restrain the activity of the Taliban militants, providing the pro-American regime in Kabul with the necessary time with the support of the army

and other security forces to take control of the country. By March 2011, ISAF consisted of 46 coalition members, and by August 2013, 47 of the 49 members of the coalition forces. In total, from 2001 to early 2014, ISAF had units of the armed forces of 50 countries around the world.

Following the assassination of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by U.S. special operations forces in May 2011, the maximum number of ISAF troops in Pakistan (as of June of that year) was 132,457 troops (including 90,000 U.S. troops). However, a number of US allies in the coalition, in connection with the inability to quickly solve the set military-political tasks, as well as on the basis of a sharp decline in public support for the war in Afghanistan in their own countries, were increasingly interested in reducing the number of losses of their own soldiers than in cleaning up Afghan territory from terrorist groups.

The positions of especially European countries had a significant impact on Washington's policy, since the entire scope of combat missions in the future would be entrusted to American servicemen, which stimulated the Obama administration to search for optimal solutions to the "Afghan problem" [Morozov Y.: 117]. As a result, 33,000 US troops who arrived in Afghanistan as part of an additional NATO contingent left the country.

This decision of President Barack Obama to withdraw part of the US troops from Afghanistan was made in the context of the preservation of the "quasi-democratic" regime of Hamid Karzai with the ANA in the country. Taking into account the specifics of the archaic Afghan society, the course towards the democratization of the country was changed. This circumstance led to the expansion of the framework of the political space of Afghanistan, capable (under certain conditions) to include moderate representatives of the armed opposition in the power structures. These were at that time the moment of reality of the United States course to "reconcile Afghanistan".

At the same time, the Obama administration assumed that the final results of the implementation of the new US policy in Afghanistan would be:

the establishment of a State authority in Kabul that would restore long-term governance to the Afghan political process;

the creation of the necessary prerequisites for achieving social stability in society and the transfer of security and law enforcement responsibilities in the country to the Afghan army and police;

determining the conditions for the withdrawal of the main groups of the US Armed Forces from the country and at the same time maintaining their influence in Afghanistan and throughout the "Greater Central Asia" [Morozov Y.: 117].

Therefore, it is no coincidence that in the fall of 2013, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 2120⁵, which extended the mandate of the ISAF presence in Afghanistan only until December 31, 2014, providing that the main NATO forces would leave the provinces under the control of the Afghan security forces within 12-18 months, except for trainers and a limited counter-terrorism contingent specifically aimed at fighting Al-Qaida.

Operation Enduring Freedom was completed by the end of 2014, and the contingent of coalition troops was significantly reduced. In the summer of 2015, the U.S. force included about 11,000 troops involved in the non-military Resolute Support mission, which included assisting Afghan law enforcement forces and training recruits.

V. Заключение

Thus, the new military and political results of the activities of the United States and NATO in the CAR were the elimination of the ruling regime of the Taliban movement and the elimination of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. A pro-Western transitional administration of the country was formed, headed by Hamid Karzai. However, despite the fact that the Taliban and the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda suffered significant damage, "the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) and the ISAF formed under the auspices of the UN could not. This circumstance predetermined the presence and combat use of large contingents of foreign

troops here until the end of 2014. Nevertheless, the implementation of military-political goals by the US administration confirmed its readiness to use military force without the sanction of the UN Security Council against any state.

Operation Enduring Freedom was of geostrategic importance. The influence of the United States in the CAR has increased, its geopolitical position in this region, which occupies a central position on the Asian continent, has become entrenched" [Slinkin M.: 337-350].

In Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries, the United States and NATO made important breakthroughs as a global military force since the opening in 2001 of the "Afghan front" in the fight against international terrorism. From the point of view of this breakthrough, until September 11, the military-political goals of Washington and their allies were aimed at reducing Russia's influence in the region and gaining access to energy resources. After the tragic events of that day, Afghanistan and the CAR have become extremely important for both the American political leadership and NATO as springboards for military operations in the framework of the newly declared war on terrorism and extremism.

Having carried out military-political intervention in the states of the CAR under the pretext of providing bases and facilities for the fight against international terrorism, the United States and NATO during the study period began to pursue a policy of interfering in the internal affairs of these countries: to impose "Western democratic orders", to counteract cooperation with Russia and China, which exacerbated the internal political situation in these countries. The response from the CAR states was the termination of the presence of American and NATO military bases on their territories and the gradual orientation towards the SCO and the CSTO in the fight against extremism and terrorism, as well as drug trafficking in the region.

The results of the study show that the solution of the military-political goals of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan did not

ensure sustainable peace in the country. They ensured the creation of a puppet regime in the Afghan state, designed to maintain cooperation and ensure a long-term presence of the United States and NATO in the country and in the region in order to implement their plans, under the pretext of conducting military operations against terrorists. which dragged on for many years.

Note

¹ Resolution 1269 (1999), United Nations Security Council 4053rd meeting, 19 October 1999 New York: United Nations. 1999. 19 oktyabrya. 4 s.

² Resolution 1333 (2000), UNSC 4251st meeting, 19 December 2000 New York: United Nations. 2000. 19 dekabrya. 8 s.

³ Resolution 1363 (2001), UNSC 4352nd meeting, 30 July 2001 New York: United Nations. 2001. 30 iyulya. 3 s.

⁴ Resolution 1378 (2001), UNSCR 4415th meeting, 14 November 2001 New York: United Nations. 2001. 14 noyabrya. 5 s.

⁵ Resolution 2120 (2013), UNSCR 7041st meeting, 10 October 2013 New York: United Nations. 2013. 10 oktyabrya. 11 s.

⁶ U.S. National Security Strategy – 2002

⁷ U.S. National Security Strategy – 2006

⁸ U.S. National Security Strategy – 2010

⁹ Charter of the United Nations.

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