



The Second Half of The XIX Century - The Policy of Resettlement of the Russian Empire in Turkestan in the Early XX Century and its Consequences (On the example of Fergana region)

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the strategic goals of the tsarist regime and the colonial nature of the resettlement policy in connection with the study of the place of the resettlement policy pursued by the Russian Empire in order to colonize Turkestan, including the Fergana region.

Keywords:

politics, colonial, government, population, purpose, serfdom, province, resettlement, metropolis, "Newkokand line", fort, "berdan", sotnya, sect, desyatina, indigenous population.

Introduction. When the Russian Empire began its military campaigns in Central Asia, it established its influence in the Bukhara and Khiva khanates and pursued other important goals. These include the acquisition of areas with rich agricultural raw materials, especially cotton and cocoons, the prospect of underground mining, the transformation of the occupied territories into a market for Russian finished goods and the use of indigenous peoples as cheap labor, and strategic (new borders with China and Iran), approaching directly to the borders of Afghanistan.

In colonial and Soviet historiography, Russia's aspiration to Central Asia was marked by the need to relocate an "excess" agrarian population from the metropolis to this vast region. There were no obstacles to moving along the Volga. In addition, the problem of "excess" agrarian population in the metropolis became apparent after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, which was why the Russian government in the 1850s deported Ural and Siberian Cossacks and thousands of Russian

Christians to the Aral Sea, Caspian area, Oqmachit and Yettisuv.

In fact, the highest political and military circles of the Russian Empire were well aware that they could not rely only on the armed forces, the military-administrative system to pursue colonial policy in the occupied territories of Central Asia, to turn it into a source of agricultural raw materials and natural resources. It was also known that it was spiritually ready to defend himself from other states, to try not to submit.

That is why, along with the development of plans for the conquest of Central Asia, it is planned to place on the occupied territories, first the Cossacks living a paramilitary life, and then the resettled (Russian, Ukrainian) population on preferential terms. Along with the Cossacks, who always had weapons (swords, rifles), in the event of local uprisings in the colony or in some parts of it, the displaced population had to be a strong and reliable base due to the supply of "berdan" rifles to the Russian population.

Many authors of works on the economic and social policy of the Russian Empire, especially resettlement policy, explained the need to relocate people to Turkestan due to the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the need to relocate people to new areas. But such a view is difficult to say, even in part, because, first, the Russian Empire relocated the Cossacks and a small urban Christian population from the Central Asian regions to the previously occupied Caucasus; secondly, long before the abolition of serfdom, in the 1850s, Russian troops occupied the Kokand Khanate, the Aral Sea, the Oqmachit, the Issyk-Kul Basin, Tokmak, Pishpek, Yettisuv, the Khiva Khanate, the Mangyshlak Peninsula, and the Caspian Sea relocated and placed in rural areas in very favorable conditions with privileges never before in the metropolis; thirdly, if the abolition of serfdom in agrarian Russia left the rural population in some provinces overpopulated and the Russian Empire did not have a selfish, aggressive aspiration to Central Asia, then the problem of overpopulation could be solved by relocating to sparsely populated provinces, the Far East, Eastern Siberia. However, Central Asian factors prevailed in this regard. If the conquest of the Caucasus would provide Russia with economic oil, strategic borders with Iran and Turkey, and a foothold in the Caspian Sea, the establishment of colonial rule in Central Asia would primarily provide the agricultural raw materials needed for metropolitan industry (cotton fiber, cocoons, livestock products) and mineral resources, opening the market to the finished product of the metropolis, as well as the first access to the borders of Afghanistan, and on the other hand to the borders of Iran and China. Therefore, the policy of resettlement had to be strategically strengthened here[1, P.12].

After the conquest of large areas of the Kokand and Khiva khanates by Russian troops, on March 2, 1865, by decree of the imperial government, the Turkestan region with its administrative center in Shymkent (now Shimkent) was formed and included in the Orenburg Governor-General.

At the same time, a military plan called the Newkokand line was launched, and after

the capture of Tashkent, the city became the administrative center of the region, and 14 months later the Turkestan region.

The Russian Empire and colonial officials, who occupied the Fergana Valley and the new territories of the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate, did not control the social and ethnic composition of the growing number of migrants from Russia to Turkestan until 1881. However, emphasis was placed on population migration and the establishment of Cossack and other Christian settlements in areas considered militarily important. Initially, the policy of resettlement of Russians in the country was mandatory. However, the number of voluntary immigrants later increased[1, P.12]. They noted that the large number of poor people among the Russian population, who migrated voluntarily and in the hope of becoming rich in the new country in a short time, made it difficult to accommodate them[2, 27-28 sheets]. After the head of the Andijan district wandered in the military provinces of the Fergana region and became a lumpen, most of those who moved to Turkestan did not have horses, but more importantly wanted to settle down.

The attitude of Russian Christians towards the local population cannot be said to be good. In most cases, indigenous peoples are ignored and often unreasonably offended [3, P.125].

According to this and many other evidences, P.G. Galuzo wrote in that politicized article "The invasion of Russian settlers in Central Asia" that Turkestan was mainly relocated by dark Christians - far from the truth. However, his comments that "they became rich by taking land from the locals and because of their ingenuity" and that "every new Russian settlement in Turkestan is equal to one battalion of Russian troops" were very true[4, P.8]

We think it is necessary to express our opinion on another important issue related to the policy of resettlement of the Russian government in Turkestan. We are talking about the historical chronology of this policy. Without rejecting the periodicity proposed by a number of researchers in this regard, we would like to

analyze only some unsubstantiated considerations. For example, economist A.M.Aminov in 1861-1891 (considering them to be the first period) was slow to develop due to the negative attitude of the imperial government to the resettlement of the Russian population in Turkestan, the first period of resettlement began in 1868 and until 1885 there were no laws - no rules," he wrote [5, P.137.].

In fact, since the establishment of Fort No.1 (formerly Oqmachit, then Perovsky, now the Red Horde), the resettlement of the Russian population and better accommodation according to conditions began. In 1847, two regiments of the Siberian Cossack army were brought to Yettisuv, and the paramilitary Cossacks began to be relocated to the future Turkestan. During this period, in response to government calls and in most cases on its own initiative, the influx of displaced Christians was strictly controlled and controlled to a certain extent. Immigrant Christians were provided with housing and employment in the cities, exempt from all taxes, and irrigated lands and pastures confiscated from the local population in rural areas. In a document sent to the government in 1873, the Governor-General of Turkestan, K.P.Kaufman, proposed to settle the Russian population in the area from Orenburg to Tashkent and from Tashkent through Verny (now Alma-Ata) to Semipalatinsk[6, 3-sheet].

This proposal was accepted in 1876, after the occupation of the Fergana Valley, in a much more complete way. The point is that K.P.Kaufman preferred the second direction, the area from Tashkent to Semipalatinsk, to turn the country into a source of agricultural raw materials after the destruction of the Kokand Khanate and the establishment of the Russian Emirate over the Bukhara Emirate, Khiva Khanate. First of all, after increasing the opportunities to solve the problem of cotton growing, two directions were given priority for the Russian population: from Orenburg via Tashkent and Khojand to Osh and Jalal-Abad, and through Khovost (then Ursatevsk) to Jizzakh, Samarkand, Amudarya. At the same time, it was noted that the Cossacks could be stationed only in the border areas of

Afghanistan, Iran and China, and German immigrants were not given "berdan" rifles.

On July 10, 1881, the Russian emperor signed the first document concerning the resettlement of the population - the "Temporary Rules for the resettlement of Christians to vacant lands belonging to the treasury." According to these rules, and in view of the further influx of Christians into the country in the near future, the imperial government and the Governor-General of Turkestan decided to give each of the men in the family 10 tithes of land and a certain amount of financial aid [7, P.7]. But religious perverts (roskolniks, starovers) who had been oppressed and banned by the official Orthodox Church in Russia since the late 17th century used to go west, but now they were Slavs of various sects, Baptists, Mennonites, Germans seeking refuge in Central Asia. It is known, that in the eighties of the XIX century, 30 families of Russian Mennonites settled near the Amudarya with the permission of the Khiva Khanate. However, those who did not belong to the Christian Orthodox faith, doubting that the Russian Empire would be the basis of the colonial system and practice in Turkestan, in 1883 adopted new rules on resettlement. From now on, only Orthodox Russians (Ukrainians, Belarusians) could be allowed to immigrate to the country. At the same time, the amount of land allocated to Russian families in rural areas, especially in Fergana and Samarkand regions, had been reduced[8, 2 sheet].

In general, the tsarist imperial government sought to bring more Russians and Orthodox Christians and urban workers from the economically and socially backward provinces of Russia into the country by adopting special laws and regulations, in 1886, 1889, 1892, 1903, and 1910 on the resettlement of the Christian (Orthodox) population in Turkestan. However, the difficult economic situation in the provinces, the prevalence of bigotry and greatness among the Russian population, and the desire to get rich quick at the expense of the local population in the Russian-dominated region prompted many to move to Central Asia without permission. For example, the Fergana region was a leader

in the fields of cotton ginning, silk, textiles, oil, and mining, and the situation of Russian farmers living in rural areas was much better than that of farmers in other areas. For example, in the village of Uspenskoe in the Andijan district, each farm had 14.5 tenths of arable land and 3 tenths of pasture land.

By 1889, the number of landless and low-income peasants and entrepreneurs in the country had increased to such an extent that on July 13, 1898, the Russian government enacted a law controlling the settlement of the rural population on state lands[9, P.121]. After that, the resettlement policy, which had stopped for a while, intensified after the revolts of Tashkent in 1892 and Andijan in 1898[10, P.136.]. As a result, the number of Russians who moved to Turkestan with official documents and with the financial support of resettlement agencies was only 2-3 times higher than the number of those who moved arbitrarily (with), and in some years less. In the Syrdarya, Samarkand, Zakaspi and Fergana regions of Turkestan, 6,000 desiatins of land were allocated for the local population[3, P.136]. This is confirmed by the following figures:

Number of immigrants to Central Asia[11, P.9-14.]

No	Years	Number of immigrants	The amount of those who migrated arbitrarily %
1	1896	178400	38
2	1897	169 thousand	39,1
3	1898	148 thousand	40
4	1899	170 thousand	46
5	1900	166 thousand	31
6	1901	89 thousand	34
7	1902	82 thousand	35
8	1903	94 thousand	33
9	1904	40 thousand	90
10	1905	64 thousand	76
11	1906	139 thousand	51
12	1907	427 thousand	20
13	1908	664777	48
14	1909	619 thousand	78

According to the figures cited, firstly, although 1894-1903 was the time when the

resettlement of the population from the metropolis to Turkestan was officially banned, the resettlement process slowed down a bit, but was not stopped and more than 30% still moved arbitrarily without knowing their exact destination; secondly, after the Andijan uprising, the Russian government, contrary to its decision, established Russian settlements in the Fergana region, where many Russians and locals lived, instead of a number of villages in the Andijan districts; thirdly, although a special department was set up to regulate the resettlement process and control the national social composition of immigrants, in 1905-1907, when the political and social situation in Russia worsened and due to P.Stolypin's agrarian reforms, the share of immigrants increased to 56-90%. It was they who perpetrated the violence against the local population.

In 1881, the Russian Empire signed an agreement with the Chinese government, which sought to annex Turkestan not only from Russia but also East Turkestan (now Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) after the destruction of the Kokand Khanate, agreed to relocate the Dungan population. In 1883 alone, more than 60,000 Uighurs, Dungans, and other Muslims emigrated from East Turkestan, but the colonial authorities only allowed them to cross the border, and accommodation, material, and moral support fell entirely to the local population. Armenians who fled Turkey to the Caspian region in 1894 moved to Ashgabat, Samarkand, Kokand, Andijan and other cities for 5-6 years[12, 3-sheet]. The influx of Muslim refugees from Kashgar itself to the Fergana region increased again in the early twentieth century in an attempt to escape the repressive policies of the Chinese authorities. Their number was 14,556 in 1904, 13,337 in 1905, 250,056 in 1907, 12,725 in 1909, and 53637 Uzbeks, Uighurs, Dungans, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other muslims migrated in 1911-1912. The task of settling them was also entrusted to the district and village elders in the cities[13, 8 sheet].

Irrigated agriculture in the country, such as the Fergana Valley, the growth of the Russian population in regions where

agriculture, especially cotton, and silkworms were developed, the joint taxes levied on local farmers, various land levies, landlessness, and national humiliation were the main causes of indigenous uprisings, protests, and large and small uprisings.

Knowing that the peoples of the region did not accept colonialism and that the immigrants were provoking the local population with their statehood, the Russian Empire and the Turkestan administration armed the Orthodox villagers with ordinary (long-barreled) rifles long before the Tashkent (1892) and Andijan (1898) uprisings, attached great importance to the organization of combat detachments in Russian (Ukrainian, Belarusian) settlements and to the constant identification and monitoring of suspects for power among Muslims. Local elders were also involved.

The military governor of Fergana region sent a written order to the head of Margilan district on October 19, 1882, ordering to suppress the riots in Yaukesak-Boston volost and to identify and arrest the organizers. The head of the Uchkurgan region, Staff Captain Danovsky, was also charged with failing to prevent riots[14. 22-23 sheet].

On August 16, 1887, the head of the Andijan district informed the military governor of the Fergana region that in the city of Andijan, in the Oyim volost, anti-Russian propaganda was being carried out and that suspicious people were organizing among the local population[15, 14-15 sheets].

In a report to the Russian emperor, Major General Tchaikovsky, the new military governor of the Ferghana region after the Andijan uprising, wrote of the political situation: Eshan's intentions did not have time to take deep root among the locals, and there were not many foolish participants in that heinous act. The population was well aware of humane rule and the power of the empire. However, the tendency against us continues to be accidental, and therefore the Russian administration needs to strengthen its control over all spheres of local life. Unfortunately, the fulfillment of such a necessary task is complicated by the fact that the region has a

very small number of administrative positions. In five counties with a population of 1/2 million, there are only 17 people exercising administrative police control, of whom only 7 (precinct supervisors) live among the local population; the other 10 live in the cities ... the volost governors and village elders are not reliable and independent enough to carry out police duties ... and the Russians, who are engaged in farming as much as possible in the province, must be relocated from the inner provinces of the empire"[16, 1-2 sheets].

As the situation of the local population in Turkestan worsened and the immigrant Russian population began to behave like a real master in Turkestan, the Russian Empire and the regional administration resorted to violence against indigenous peoples, widespread repression, and the supply of weapons to the Russian Orthodox population. This process was intensified by the adoption of the "Rules for the voluntary resettlement of people living in villages and towns in the Syrdarya, Fergana and Samarkand regions,"[17, P.3] approved by Nicholas II on June 10, 1903.

The practice was such that the chiefs of the great counties, by their orders, protested without any courts, imprisoned the peasants who refused to give their horses and chariots to the work of the colonial authorities, or defended their lands from the Russian Christians. For example, on August 13, 1912, Captain Bogaevsky, acting head of the Namangan district, sentenced 64 peasants to 20 days in jail each[18, 233 sheet].

On the eve of the First World War, on July 28, 1914, in a letter sent by the military governor of Fergana region to the governor-general of the region, the following comments were made: "In a telegram sent to me today, the head of the Osh district expressed concern about the possibility of war and the possible revolt of the indigenous population due to the withdrawal of troops, so he asked for permission to give weapons to the Russians in order to protect the Christian population.... the locals are outraged by the guilt of the Russian population. The head of the Andijan district, who still remembers the uprising, also expressed similar concerns. Therefore, I ask

you to leave some troops in Andijan, Osh and Kokand during the war and immediately move to Andijan one of the “hundreds” (sotnya) in Skobelev”[19, 4 sheet].

In the first days of the war, the military governor of Fergana sent an order to the heads of the districts to give rifles and ammunition to the population and their teams in the Russian settlements[19, 22 sheet]. On August 12, 1914, Acting Governor-General Lieutenant-General Flug addressed all the military governors of the region: It is important to ensure that the weapon is used, stored and that it does not fall into the wrong hands. [20, 15 sheet]” In the same month, separate teams of 8-12 men were formed and armed in each Russian settlement (German and other Christian populations were not provided with weapons)[20, 133 sheet]

Since 1915, thousands of foreign prisoners of war (Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, Poles, Germans, Turks, etc.) were brought to Turkestan and settled mainly in rural areas, and refugees began to arrive from areas near the western front. A mandatory military tax was also introduced for the indigenous population. This also became a heavy burden on the local population. Defeated on the Western Front, the Russian Empire, among other measures to overcome the military-political crisis, found it necessary to involve 19-43-year-old Turkestan men in front-line defense and industry, and a royal decree was issued on June 25, 1916. General Galkin was assigned to determine the practical implementation of this decree in the country. 250,000 workers from Turkestan, including 77,000 from the Fergana region, were to be sent to the western regions of the empire[21, 15 sheet]. The implementation of the decree was one of the reasons for the beginning of the popular uprising in the country.

Here we consider it necessary to highlight some important aspects of this issue:

First, the colonial authorities of the country took an active part in the preparation of the king's decree and provided the necessary information to the imperial government. According to these data, the number of indigenous men in Turkestan at the beginning of 1916 was almost 3.5 million (3332200). This

means that the 250,000 workers to be sent to Russia were close to 8% of the total number of indigenous men in the country[21, 106 sheet]. According to 1914 data, the male population in Fergana region was 1 million 172 thousand 142 people [21, 106 sheet]. However, the head of state Martson instructed to leave more workers in the cotton-growing region, and therefore in the Fergana region, which has the largest cotton area, the number of workers left would be covered by Syrdarya, Yettisuv regions. It was agreed to send 50,000 workers from Fergana region, which is 27,000 less.

Second, a Turkmen regiment formed in 1915 was recruited from Turkestan in the Russian active army, and thousands of local, Muslim workers who had previously suffered from unemployment in the country worked in various industries of the metropolis.

Third, the question of how to execute the decree was also discussed. Based on the size of the male population, there were suggestions to determine the amount of forced conscription to provinces, counties, and volosts, or to determine the number of conscripts sent from each family as workers. The military governor of the Fergana region, Lieutenant-General Gippius, said that the upper classes of the population did not give their people voluntarily, and that the families of the priests did not have physically strong, able-bodied people. Because of the discussion, the first proposal was approved and at the same time it was considered expedient to compile family lists for control. It was noted that it is necessary to carry out a broad explanatory work on the need for the best, talented workers among the population[21, 15 sheet].

After the Andijan uprising, the imperial leadership, which increased its focus on the social composition of the population being evacuated from the metropolis after 1916 uprising, intensified its economic, social and national oppression in the policy of resettlement, without taking into account the interests and rights of the indigenous peoples of Turkestan.

However, there were many intellectuals in the country who were innovative, populist and nationalistic and had a deep understanding

of the prospects for development. This was a very important factor in the fact that the struggle against tyranny in Turkestan, including in the Fergana Valley, was very sharp and long-lasting, as the experience of the indigenous people in the struggle against colonialism and independence was much richer.

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