



Saudi Arabia-U.S .Relations (Political -Economic-Military)

Ali Ghafil Hasan

Directorate of Dhi Qar Education, Ministry of Education of Iraq,
IRAQ
ali.ghafil73@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Saudi Arabia, controlled by the Al Saud dynasty since 1932, holds tremendous global influence through its management of the Islamic faith's birthplace and through its vast oil deposits. Since the 1940s, close US-Saudi official relations have weathered a series of setbacks, and the US Administration has attempted to bolster US connections to Saudi officials as the kingdom embarks on a series of major internal and foreign policy initiatives. Successive U.S. administrations have referred to the Saudi regime as an important partner, and the United States has maintained political-economic-military ties with the country while subjecting it to legislative supervision and facing some congressional resistance. As part of its ongoing commitment to ensuring the internal and external security of the kingdom, the United States continues to press on the implementation of significant reform programs. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has maintained close ties with the United States. The U.S.-Saudi partnership is one of America's most important, longstanding, and complex bilateral links in the Middle East. It has been tested by several challenges, including oil policies, the Arab Israeli conflict, and hostility with Iraq. Especially following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, in which many of those involved were Saudi dissidents, both sides have questioned and reevaluated the link. This article offers a history of the U.S.-Saudi connection Political- Economic-Military and explores its nature, difficulties, and limits.

Keywords:

Saudi Arabia, U.S, Relations, Political, Economic, Military.

Introduction

A number of major powers, primarily the United States, have expressed an interest in Saudi Arabia due to its wide geographical area and enormous oil potential the presence of Islamic holy sites, and the character of its political system centered on family control (Bronson, 2005). As part of the United States' "openness to the Middle East," interest in Saudi Arabia began to grow in the late nineteenth century and gradually increased throughout the twentieth century, owing to several factors, the most significant of which was the discovery the oil in the 1930s (Bronson, 2008). After World War II, the Soviet Union's anti-capitalist

ideology and growing political, military, and economic role prompted the US to increase its interests in the Middle East in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Saudi Arabia has become a US strategy and a vital part of its "interests in the region" (Hudson, 2005). Saudi-American relations are based on a series of interactions between the two countries in their political, economic, and security aspects that have a negative or positive impact on the course of these relations and aim to determine their nature, whether it is characterized by cooperation or something else (Aziz, 2019). International relations, particularly those between developed countries such as the United

States of America, which ranks first in the global political system, and "developing" countries such as Saudi Arabia, which falls into the third world system in terms of development standards and power equations among nations, should be studied and expect a broad regional role.

History of Saudi-U.S .Relations

Following his success in uniting the Arabian Peninsula under his loyalty in 1928, King Abdulaziz Al Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, sought international recognition for his young kingdom. Britain was the first country to recognize Saudi Arabia as an independent state, and the United States followed suit shortly after (McHale, 1980).

Saudi-U.S .Political Relations

Early American involvement in the Arabian Peninsula coincided with the region's fast expansion in the first half of the twentieth century. Ibn Saud sought international recognition and diplomatic relations with European countries to establish his place in the region after victorious opening of Jeddah in 1925 and taking full control of Hijaz in 1926, selling his people king in 1926, and becoming known as king of Hijaz, Sultan Najd, and its accessories (Al-Kahtani, 2004). The Saudi Foreign Ministry informed the US State Department of its desire for diplomatic recognition from the US through the US Commission in Cairo in late September 1928. The Secretary of State of the United States, Frank Kellogg, responded amicably to the request, saying that the time was not right "to give a definite answer" (Al-Ruwaithy, 1990). It was a lack of recognition of the Saudi regime due to the US's lack of links with the area. However, following the occurrence of certain political developments in Hijaz and Najd, such as the expansion of ibn Saud's influence and dominance over Tihama and Assir known as Idrissi, and his subsequent appointment as king of Hijaz and Najd, and their annexes, United States' conducted a series of negotiations with the representative of Prince Faisal bin Abdul Aziz on common relations with their allies and

their recognition of Saudi regime (Determann, 2010). As a result of these consultations, the US administration decided to approve Bert Fish as a non-resident minister in Saudi Arabia, and he arrived in Jeddah on February 4, 1940, where he presented his credentials to King Ibn Saud. It should be noted that Standard Oil of California was carrying out political work despite the absence of diplomatic representation (Little, 1990). In 1929, the stabilization of Saudi Arabia's political and internal circumstances prompted the US administration to contemplate recognizing the Saudi state, particularly after the latter established treaties with Germany, Turkey, and Iran. In February 10, 1931, Washington directed US Ambassador to London Charles Dayus to advise Minister Commissioner Hijazi in London that the US is prepared to hold negotiations to establish relations (Knauerhase, 1980). The United States diplomatically acknowledged the "Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd" on March 1, 1931. The US State Department has also attempted to develop connections with him by negotiating a treaty of friendship, commerce. On 7 November 1932, the treaty was signed in London and entered into force the next day (Trunov, 2019). However, despite Saudi Arabia's formal recognition of the United States, the United States has not rushed to establish a permanent diplomatic presence there or to bear the costs of establishing a Commission, citing the fact that trade relations between them were within their safe borders, as well as the global economic recession at the time, and the United States has instead relied on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Cairo to protect their interests (Prados & Blanchard, 2007). Despite pressure from Standard Oil of California on the US State Department, the US State Department refused to establish diplomatic representation in the country following the acquisition of the oil concession in 1933 (Fitzgerald, 1991). Following the United States' direct entry into World War II on December 8, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1945-1933) informed the State Department on February 10, 1943, of his desire to establish a permanent commission in Saudi Arabia and to retain Alexetaker Kirk as minister

delegate in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while also appointing a charge d'affaires and a limited number of permanent residents in Jeddah (Kennedy, 2018). However, as the United States' interest in Saudi Arabia grew, particularly following the events of World War II, its first commission opened in Jeddah on September 19, 1943, and James Moss assumed the position of Minister Commissioner in Jeddah, acting as charge d'affaires and US diplomatic representation at the time. On September 2, 1944, the United States established a consulate in Dhahran and appointed him deputy consul (Nasser, 1990). The Second World War ended with the United States emerging as the world's political, economic, and military power on September 2, 1945, and the US established a strong peer relationship with the British, solidifying its position as the world's postwar state power. In 1945, Saudi Arabia occupied a prominent position in US interest due to its enormous "oil" reserves, estimated at 30 billion tons, prompting the US Secretary of State's representative to state at the start of 1946 that protecting the Kingdom's sovereignty and security is a primary objective of the US (Silverfarb, 1983). Childs became his first ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1948, when his commissioner in Jeddah was raised to an embassy. He served in that capacity until 1951. Saudi representation in the United States was established in February 1946, with Asaad al-Faqih (of Syrian origin) serving as the first minister delegate in Washington (Bierly, 2017). The emergence of US oil interests in Saudi Arabia in the late 1930s was considered as a turning point in US-Middle Eastern relations, given there was no US presence in the region before World War II. Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States were temporarily strained following the end of the British mandate on Palestine on May 14, 1948, the immediate recognition of the State of Israel by the United States on the same day, and the participation of Saudi forces in the fight against Israeli forces in Palestine (Labelle, 2011). On July 6, 1948, the Saudi Finance Minister informed the United States charge d'affaires that his government was no longer willing to

utilize the Import and Export Bank's finances, and confirmed that his decision was based on the United States' managerial policy toward Palestine (Blanchard, 2010). In 1951, the two nations signed a joint military pact, and the following year, the United States' oil exploration business in the Kingdom was renamed from California Arabian Standard Oil to the current Arab-American Oil Company, Aramco. King Saud bin Abdul Aziz became the first Saudi king to visit the United States in January 1957, at the invitation of US President Eisenhower, and he returned in 1962 to meet with US President John F. Kennedy and negotiate bilateral investments and economic cooperation (McHale, 1980). In 1966, during the reign of King Faisal, he met with US President Lyndon B. Johnson to propose forming a cooperation to collaborate on development initiatives in the Kingdom. In 1971, King Faisal met with US President Richard Nixon in Washington, and three years later, Nixon paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, which is significant in bilateral relations because it is the first visit of a US president to Saudi Arabia, where the Saudi-American Joint Economic Commission was established in 1974 (Mejcher, 2004). Despite the difficult regional and international turns of the 1967 and 1973 wars, and the ensuing repercussions, particularly the 1973 energy crisis, which prevented Saudi Arabia from selling oil to the United States and Europe due to their position on the October War, the relationship between the two countries has continued to grow and develop (Issawi, 1978). Despite the fact that their relationship is dictated by two conflicting perspectives on the Palestinian issue, Saudi Arabia is a supporter of the Palestinian cause and the US is prejudiced in its support for the Israeli side on that issue, the two nations' relationship is doing well (Bzostek & Robison, 2008). Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States peaked in the early 1990s, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, when the Kingdom requested assistance from the United States of America in liberating Kuwait, which had already been accomplished through cooperative efforts (Rich, 2012). Military operations involving the two countries and the

United States President George W. Bush (Sr.), the United States' President, was the most frequently visited by the Kingdom during that time period, paying three visits in three consecutive years, the first on November 30, 1990 (Fatimah, 2005). In 1994, US President Bill Clinton paid a visit to the Kingdom and met with King Fahd in the city of Hafr al-Batin to discuss bilateral relations, a period that saw the control of American aircraft for the no-fly zone in southern Iraq and the protection of American oil tankers in the Gulf, and in 1995, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz paid a visit to the US to attend the United Nations' fiftieth anniversary celebrations (Rich, 2012). The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania by four hijacked planes killed 2,977 people and cost an estimated \$150 billion in property, infrastructure, and economic impact; fifteen of the 19 terrorists were from Saudi Arabia, as was the terrorist organization's leader, Osama bin Laden. In 1994, Osama bin Laden's Saudi citizenship was revoked, and he was banished from the country (Pollack, 2002).

Saudi American Economic Relations

On November 28, 1922, the British Frank Holmes asked the representative of the Eastern and Gietieral syrulicate business in the Arabian Gulf region to hold the Conference of Al-Aqir, granting him a concession "for oil exploration in Al-Hasa" (Eckes Jr, 1981). In August 1923, he was able to persuade Ibn Saud to offer the concession in exchange for £2,000 a year in annual rent and a mortgage negotiated after the discovery of oil. If the corporation failed to take advantage of the lease or did not carry out exploration within 18 months, Ibn Saud had the power to cancel the concessions, according to the agreement (Anderson, 2014). However, Holmes was unable to locate oil two years after the concession was granted, prompting Ibn Saud to cancel the concession in 1928 after the company defaulted on payments to his government. As a result, the company decided to withdraw from the Saudi concession and sold it to the California Oil Company in December 1928 (Lewis, 1990). It is evident that King Ibn Masood

preferred to provide exploration rights to Americans rather than British businesses for a variety of reasons, including the more favorable offers made by American companies. Along with King Ibn Saud's reservations about the British government's intentions in the Arab world and his reassurances to the Americans (Clifford, 1976). He believes that American companies are independent of his government, which keeps them from pursuing political objectives, as King Ibn Saud believes that the strength of the American economy is greater than that of the British economy, which means that American companies can contribute more to the development of the Saudi economy than British companies, and perhaps most importantly, the position of British politicians sympathetic to the Hashemite in resolving border disputes (Vitalis, 2002). The United States' rise to prominence in the political arena appears to be the result of a modern and strong country that is more significant to the King of Saudi Arabia than the British (Blanchard, 2010). Since the early 19th century, the United States has been opening up commercially to the world, including the Arabian Gulf. The first oil well was drilled in the east of the Kingdom in 1933, and the economic factor helped draw attention to American policy towards Saudi Arabia, especially the leadership of American companies, as well as increase the chances of finding oil after a company acquired the oil company concession (Telhami, 2002). However, the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938, as well as the growing interest of oil companies in some countries, including Italy, Germany, and Japan, prompted the United States administration to reconsider the matter, particularly after receiving reports from its commissions in Egypt and Baghdad that the establishment of diplomatic representation would satisfy King Ibn Saud and enhance the prestige of the United States in the Near East (Jaffe & Ellass, 2007). The discoveries of American geologist Carl Twilichell in Saudi Arabia in 1931, based on Saudi breeding tests, indicated the likelihood of minerals, particularly oil, being found in the country (Nurunnabi, 2017). On May 29, 1933, the California company acquired a 360,000-

square-mile dot concession in Saudi Arabia, as well as preference rights to obtain additional oil concessions in the country. On July 7, 1933, King Ibn Saud signed Decree No. (1135) granting the California company a 60-year concession (US Federal Trade Commission, 1952). In April 1934, the Dammam office of the United States Oil Exploration Company opened its doors. On October 16, 1938, it was discovered in commercial quantities. In 1939, the first meal was sent from the Saudi port of Ras Tanura to the United States on a U.S. oil tanker, which arrived on May 1. Producing 500,000 tons in 1939, four million tons in 1940, and more than five million tons in 1941 marked a significant rise in production (Alkharashi & Nickerson, 2012). In terms of trade connections with Saudi Arabia, the United States' exports to the country grew in the 1930s, reaching \$208,000 per year in 1937 and 1938, and then doubling to \$400,000 per year (Ottaway, 2009). In 1936, Standard Oil of California, which was seeking oil disposal markets, entered into an arrangement with the Texas business on July 1, 1936, which became effective on July 1. Because of World War II, which began in September 1939, the United States' oil policy underwent a significant transformation, with the real value of oil shifting from its monetary economic value to a first-class worldwide strategic significance (Branine, 2011). It also had a significant impact on Saudi-American relations, causing economic difficulties for the kingdom as a result of the low numbers of pilgrims who came to the Holy Land. In addition, the agricultural season has been hampered by the absence of farmers as a result of King Ibn Saud's withdrawal of his troops in order to avoid provocations on the border with Iraq and eastern Jordan, while exports from Aramco have suffered as a result of the loss of security on the sea lanes and the gradual decline in the number of American and European technical experts who have been assisting Saudi Arabia in a variety of fields (Baig & Straquadine, 2014). King Ibn Saud began maneuvering American corporations that could gain from competition in 1940 in order to overcome these hurdles. "of British companies, but financial aid provided by the British government." Aramco

has not been able to resolve its financial difficulties. On April 16, 1941, Aramco proposed to President Roosevelt that the United States provide money to King Ibn Saud. The company noted that Ibn Saud stated that money could be saved in the form of a loan from the loan and lease program to purchase oil at current prices, and as a result, the United States will provide a reduced loan from King Ibn Saud for up to six years (Malone, 2015). Standard Oil of California acquired another concession from the Saudi government on April 31, 1939, seeking the area covered by its first concession, which had grown to 80,000 square miles and now included the right to dispose of the Saudi government in the neutral areas between Iraq and Kuwait (US Federal Trade Commission, 1952). It was the latter that was looking for oil sources outside of the United States to meet the needs of its extensive distribution network, and the two companies came together from a company known as Caltex, which changed its name in 1944 to become the Arab American Oil Company, and the two companies became one (Aramco) (Seccombe, 1986). Because the commercial interests of US oil firms were the major trigger for developing such relations, especially after World War II, oil was undoubtedly a key role in establishing strong relations between Saudi Arabia and the US. To support Saudi Arabia and remove British influence, President Roosevelt decided on February 18, 1943, to annex the kingdom using the construction and leasing program to take advantage of the loan law, and the United States began to think about the Trans Arabian Pipeline, and after reports and studies by oil agencies on US reserves showed And post-war. The Chief of Staff and the US Navy were involved in these investigations, which were heavily scrutinized by Congress. Extending US influence over Saudi Arabia is considered crucial to US dominance (Long, 2019). The oil had a key role in the United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia. After the US decided to include Saudi Arabia in the loan and lease program on February 18, 1943, Saudi Arabia received up to \$5 million in 1943 and up to \$12 million in 1944 (Wiegel, 2021). On February 14, 1945, onboard the

Quincy Barge, President Roosevelt met King Ibn Saud in person to document their friendship. Its oil industry, Palestinian issue, and US airbase in Dhahran were all discussed during their talks. He also promised to extend the Arabian Peninsula oil pipeline from Al-Ahsa to the Mediterranean beaches, order to increase the kingdom's contribution to the country's development (Peterson, 2020). In 1946, the US government gave Saudi Arabia a \$10 million loan, and Saudi Arabia got a \$2 million loan from the US to acquire American weaponry and military equipment, indicating the chances for cooperation (Sharp, 2010). The Saudi oil industry grew fast after WWII, with California and Texas joining Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil Oil by the end of 1946, despite British monopolies' opposition due to the Red Line Agreement (Madureira, 2017). The new agreement on a lease allowance for oil exploration in the shelf area was signed in October 1948, and Al-Jarf and Aramco agreed to benefit from a rental price similar to that stipulated in the initial concession contract plus five cents per barrel, and agreed to set a 22-year period, during which sectors that do not intend to continue exploration gradually were restored (Anderson, 2014). Aramco's output reached 25 million tons in 1950, increasing the kingdom's profits to \$90 million, according to the Jeddah Agreement signed on December 20, 1950, granting the Saudi government half of Aramco's net profit (Nakov & Nuño, 2011).

It is evident to us that cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States has continued, as has cooperation in other sectors, such as agriculture, irrigation systems, and other related areas of expertise. With the support of the United States, a railway connecting Dammam and Riyadh was finished in 1951 (Fiaz, Noor & Aldosri, 2018). Saudi Arabia has expanded its agricultural land area, built an irrigation network, paved roads, and founded an airline thanks to U.S. financial support. Both Jeddah and Ras Tanura seaports have been renovated and enlarged, and education programs have been carried out in Saudi Arabia with the American University of Beirut's support (Baig & Straquadine, 2014).

Between 1950, Saudi Arabia and Aramco agreed to split oil production and export revenues 50-50, then in 1973 and 1980, the Saudis took complete control of the firm (Alabdullatif, 2015). After that, it evolved into something more than a diplomatic connection when it was designated as a partnership in 1957, and it has since progressed to the stage of a strategic alliance that has become stronger and stronger as the Saudi and American administrations have achieved greater success (Ottaway, 2010). During the reign of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Oil Company (also known as Saudi Aramco) was established by royal decree in 1988, replacing the previous Aramco. As a result of the end of the Cold War in 1989, cooperation between the two countries grew exponentially, with Saudi Arabia diverting \$100 billion to the United States for projects carried out by American companies in Saudi Arabia as well as student fellowships for Saudi students attending American universities. When Clinton visited Saudi Arabia in 1994, he requested that the Saudi government give a \$4 billion contract to a United States telecommunications system for system modernization (Monitor, 2018).

Saudi-U.S .Military Relations

Planners and implementers of Saudi defense policy have been working to improve the country's military capabilities since the country's founding, and the country's defense strategy is based on intertwined factors:

The first is a low population density, which is defined by restricted military capabilities and alternatives accessible in terms of the kind of armed forces that can be produced. Second, Saudi Arabia was ranked first in both the Islamic and oil spheres, as it possessed the world's greatest oil reserves, accounting for 20 percent of total worldwide reserves, and as a result, Saudi Arabia established military priority for the sake of national security. Levels of strategic importance. Third, the kingdom's economic and social modernization movement, which is linked to the process of military renewal through the implementation of an integrated development program. Fourth, the state's size and the

extension of its frontiers have given it "strength and strategic depth" in the face of foreign military involvement. The presence of various countries on the edges of their external boundaries has imposed the distribution of their military resources and security worries, as well as the disappearance of enormous portions of the kingdom's territory, in addition to the kingdom's antagonistic attitude towards global communism (Saab, 2014). Saudi Arabia, for example, has established strong ideological and political relationships with the United States and European countries, as well as military ties with these countries (Byman & Moller, 2016). As a result of the United States' direct involvement in World War II in late 1941, Washington has moved to strengthen its relations with Saudi Arabia, with one of the primary reasons being the United States' consideration of the project of establishing airports for United States army aviation in the Kingdom, as well as the need for extensive facilities in order to continue the war, as stated in a letter addressed by President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud on February 13, 1942 (Nardulli, 2002). In his response, which was delivered on March 23, 1942, Ibn Saud stated his willingness to provide considerable and significant aid to the United States war effort, emphasizing the importance of everyone responsible for contributing to this purpose. The end of 1942 marked the beginning of a radical shift in U.S. policy in the Arabian Gulf region, which was the result of two primary factors: the first was allied military efforts in regard to military supplies across the Arabian Gulf and Persian Gulf, and the second was oil, which was no longer a commercial project for U.S. oil companies due to the war in Europe. The decision to add Saudi Arabia was made on February 18, 1943, and the country immediately acquired the military equipment required under the Loan and Leasing Act, which included rifles, ammunition, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and planes, among other things (Al-Kahtani, 2004). Saudi Arabia had to equip a force of 100,000 men in addition to the request of US advisers among Saudi education on how to use it, but military aid was not approved by some American circles due to

opposition from Britain, which warned that it is preferable to provide Saudi Arabia with sufficient weapons and military equipment to maintain security in the country because providing them with too many weapons leads to smuggling them (Nardulli, 2002). The king consented to proposals made by President Roosevelt in this regard when the State Department brought up the topic of the administration's role in preserving Saudi oil fields and limited it to actions that may be implemented in an emergency. And to continue construction of the Dhahran air base, but it would not be subject to military occupation and would be leased for five years before being returned to the Saudi government in exchange for the US continuing to provide military and economic support to Saudi Arabia (Kennedy, 2018). A treaty was signed between Saudi Arabia and the United States on June 18, 1951. The agreement extended the investment in the Dhahran base for another five years, allowing the Kingdom to purchase weapons from the United States, as the latter pledged to equip the Saudi army with modern aircraft and tanks. A special annex to the agreement stipulated that American expert would train Saudi pilots, as it was decided to send Saudi students to train in U.S. military centers and institutes (Prados & Blanchard, 2007). For more than half a century, the United States Military Training Mission has been located at Dhahran Air Base in Saudi Arabia, managing U.S. military aid, and there have also been "United States Military Engineering Units that have helped to construct Dhahran Base (Russell, 2002). Closer military collaboration has been developed, which is yet another manifestation of the United States' new Middle East policy. The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a military agreement on June 27, 1953 (Prados, 2001). It has been developing its military capabilities since the late 1960s, which have been aided by a variety of circumstances, the most prominent of which is the civil war in Yemen (1970-1992), as well as the fact that it has sufficient capacity. Credibility in self-defense, as well as the kingdom's importance at the oil level, drove the kingdom's unavoidable shift to an acceptable regional defense formula,

which grew in importance when the region's stability improved, as well as its ideological fight (Terrill, 2011). Egypt's politics under President Gamal Abdel Nasser Saudi efforts focused on a first stage in ensuring foreign political coverage by strengthening and linking its relations with the US, and the military priority at the time required air protection, and in 1962, Egyptian forces attacked Saudi territory from Yemen during the Yemeni revolution as a result of what the Saudis described as counter-revolutionary propaganda. In July 1963, President John Kennedy dispatched US bombers to the region to assist Saudi soldiers (Ferris, 2008). Following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Gulf region in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was hesitant to accept new security duties in the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia are two regional powers that President Richard Nixon's administration has sought to rely on to protect U.S. interests in the region. It was during this time period that the dollar value of military transactions between the United States and Saudi Arabia climbed dramatically (from \$16 million in 1970 to \$312 million in 1972) (Brannon, 1994). An agreement on economic and military cooperation between Washington and Riyadh was signed in May 1974 by the leaders of both countries. 1975 saw the signing of \$2 billion worth of military deals between the two countries, which included the provision of 60 fighter jets for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was "defended against communism" when the United States dispatched F15 fighter fighters to the country in January 1979. At the time, the two countries were supporting Islamic forces in Afghanistan (Blanchard, 2018). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 resulted in a strengthening of bilateral security ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The United States expressed concern for Saudi Arabia's safety. Former US President George W. Bush approved the deployment of a substantial number of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia (up to 543,000 ground troops by the end of the operation) to protect them from a supposed Iraqi invasion (Dris-Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007). In October 2010, the State Department informed

Congress of its intention to conclude with Saudi Arabia the largest arms transaction in United States history, valued at \$60 billion. President Barack Obama of the United States said in March 2015 that he had authorized U.S. personnel to give intelligence and logistical support to the Saudi Arabian military campaign in Yemen. In May 2017, Trump authorized the largest arms deal in United States history, valued at nearly \$110 billion and \$300 billion over a 10-year period, which included training and close cooperation with the Saudi military (Allison & Cordesman, 2010). It is estimated that between 2009 and 2016, United States and Saudi Arabia finalized \$139 billion in arms sales deals, according to research by the Congressional Research Service. Global military spending hit \$1.9 trillion in 2019 (Tian, 2020).

Conclusion

Relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States began on a limited scale in the early twentieth century and were mostly focused on missionary and medical issues. The United States realized that Britain has precedence and preference in the Arabian Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula on the one hand, and limits on U.S. interests in the region on the other. There have been several major developments in world history, including the ascent of the United States to superpower, the discovery of oil as a critical component for managing life's wheel in a capitalist society, and the fall of the Soviet Union. This has led to an increase in the United States' efforts to establish itself in the Greater Middle East, particularly in the Arabian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. The United States is concerned that it may fall into the hands of a hostile force in the region. The discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the kingdom in 1938 prompted the government to contemplate designating it as a special region of U.S. influence. At the same time, the Saudis had a solid ally in the United States to help them handle their difficulties. The meeting between King Ibn Saud and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the Quincy Barge in 1945 was one part of the two countries' rapprochement. Differing perspectives on photography and

politics have also contributed to a rift between the two countries.

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